Keying  Material—  Superseded  keying  material must be destroyed first, then keying material that becomes effective in 1 or 2 months. Nonessential   Classified   COMSEC Documents—  This   material   includes maintenance,  operating,  and  administrative manuals. COMPLETE DESTRUCTION.—  When com- plete  destruction  is  ordered,  COMSEC  material  must  be destroyed as follows: Keying Material— Keying material is always destroyed first in the following order: superseded, effective, then reserve. Superseded keying material that has been used to encrypt  traffic  is  the  most  sensitive  of  the  three categories. If superseded keying material falls into enemy hands, all past intercepted traffic is subject to compromise and analysis. Superseded keying material must be destroyed within 12 hours after supersession. Effective   keying   material   is   destroyed   after superseded  keying  material.  Reserve  keying  material is  keying  material  that  will  become  effective  within  the next 30 days. Reserve keying material is destroyed after effective keying material. Keying material must be stored in priority order for destruction.  Top  Secret  material  must  be  destroyed ahead of Secret material, and Secret material destroyed ahead of Confidential material. This applies to all categories of keying material. COMSEC  Documents—  COMSEC documents are   destroyed   next.   COMSEC   documents include cryptoequipment maintenance manuals, operating instructions, general publications, status   publications,   CMS-holder   lists   and directories.   COMSEC   documents   contain information on the types of cryptoequipments we use, the level of technology we have attained, and  the  way  our  COMSEC  operations  are organized and conducted. COMSEC Equipment— COMSEC equipment is destroyed last. In emergencies, the immediate goal regarding cryptoequipment is to render the equipment  unusable  and  unrepairable.  The operating   and   technical   manuals   for cryptoequipments   provide   details   on   the techniques for rapid and effective destruction. VERIFY  DESTRUCTION.—  There are two parts to verifying the destruction of COMSEC material, witnessing and inspection of destroyed material. Two  individuals  conducting  the  destruction  must personally witness the complete destruction of the material. Then, they will sign and date the destruction documents   after   all   material   has   actually   been destroyed. An inspection of the destroyed material must ensure that  the  destruction  is  complete  and  the  destruction device  is  working  properly.  When  using  shredders, choppers, pulverizers or pulpers, you need only to examine a sample of the residue. If you are using an incinerator, verify that all residue is broken up by stirring or sifting through the remains. The last detail is to inspect the surrounding area afterwards to ensure that no material escaped during the destruction   process. The destruction plan itself is contained in the overall emergency plan. The emergency plan should always provide for securing, removing, or destroying the material, depending on the situation. The  appropriate  course  of  action  and  timing  should be stated in the overall destruction plan. For example, if there is a local civil uprising that appears to be short-lived,  destroying  all  material  would  probably  not be necessary. In this situation, a partial destruction of the more sensitive superseded material might be made, some of the remaining material removed, and the rest secured. The commanding officer will normally implement the emergency plan. Should the situation prevent contact  with  the  commanding  officer,  other  individuals, such as the COMSEC officer or COMSEC custodian, are usually authorized to implement the plan. During an   emergency,   personnel   safety   overrides   the destruction  priority. TWO-PERSON INTEGRITY Two-person integrity (TPI) is the security measure taken  to  prevent  single-person  access  to  COMSEC keying  material  and  cryptographic  maintenance manuals. TPI is accomplished as follows: The constant presence of two authorized persons when COMSEC material is being handled; The use of two combination locks on security containers used to store COMSEC material; and 3-9