reconstructed with minimum effort. Figure 4-14 shows
a simplified step diagram of a normal reconstruction
effort.
COOP TESTING
Because emergencies do not occur often, it is
difficult to assure adequacy and proficiency of
personnel and plans without regular training and
testing. Therefore, it is important to plan and budget
for both. The availability of needed backup files may
be tested by attempting to repeat a particular task using
onsite hardware but drawing everything else from the
offsite location. Experience demonstrates the value of
such tests in validating backup provisions; it is not
uncommon to discover gross deficiencies despite the
most careful planning. Compatibility with the offsite
facility should be verified regularly by running one or
more actual tasks. A number of AIS facilities conduct
such tests as a part of an overall inspection.
Figure 4-14.—Simplified diagram of an AIS facility
4-30
Similar tests of procedures for fire fighting, loss
control, evacuation, bomb threat, and other
emergencies will give assurance that plans are adequate
and workable. At the same time. they provide an
opportunity for training AIS personnel. Each test
should have a specific objective. A team should be
assembled to prepare a scenario for the test, to control
and observe the test, and to evaluate the results. This
evaluation provides guidance for modifications to
emergency plans and for additional training. The
important point is to be sure the emergency plans do, in
fact, contribute to the security of the AIS facility.
SECURITY INSPECTIONS
The final element of the AIS security program for
every naval AIS facility should be a review or
inspection process. The inspection should be an
independent and objective examination of the
information system and its use (including
organizational components) and including the
following checks:
Checks to determine the adequacy of controls,
levels of risks, exposures, and compliance with
standards and procedures; and
Checks to determine the adequacy and effec-
tiveness of system controls versus dishonesty,
inefficiency, and security vulnerabilities.
The words independent and objective imply the
inspection complements normal management inspec-
tions, visibility, and reporting systems and is neither a
part of, nor a substitute for, any level of management.
What can an inspection be expected to accomplish?
First, it evaluates security controls for the AIS facility.
Second, it provides each level of management an
opportunity to improve and update its security program.
Third, it provides the impetus to keep workers and
management from becoming complacent. Fourth, if
done effectively, it tends to uncover areas of
vulnerability. Remember, risks change, and new threats
arise as systems mature.
Major factors to consider in determining the
frequency of internal inspections include the frequency
of external inspections, the rate of change of the AIS,
the amount and adequacy of controls, the threats that
face the facility, the results of previous inspections, and
the directions of higher authority. Inspection activity,
direction, and implementation are usually at the
discretion of the commanding officer of the command
with jurisdiction over the AIS facility.
